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Abstract
It is fairly clear that there is a need, in terms of global and comparative perspectives, to explore alternative
schemes for thinking about the role of the state with respect to religious communication. The
predominant mode of discussion, especially in the comfortable discourse of modern Western traditions,
is to lodge analysis in terms of free speech and human rights. Increasingly, however, that discourse is
insufficient descriptively and in danger of irrelevance prescriptively. Religious or implicitly religious speech
is inflected with new power, as if it were a form of violence itself. Religious communication becomes a
transcendent force with a claim to authority higher than that of other forms of speech. Religious speech,
because it has the capacity to motivate large-scale attitudes, raises important questions as to the manner
by which national and global identities are formed. As 'religion' becomes an integral aspect of defining
international oppositions and threats to national security, how states think about the propagation of
messages by religious groups changes greatly.
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Religious Communication and Its Relation
to the State: Comparative Perspectives

1. Introduction
It is fairly clear that there is a need, in terms of global and comparative
perspectives, to explore alternative schemes for thinking about the role of
the state with respect to religious communication. The predominant mode
of discussion, especially in the comfortable discourse of modern Western
traditions, is to lodge analysis in terms of free speech and human rights.
Increasingly, however, that discourse is insufficient descriptively and in
danger of irrelevance prescriptively. Religious or implicitly religious speech
is inflected with new power, as if it were a form of violence itself. Religious
communication becomes a transcendent force with a claim to authority
higher than that of other forms of speech. Religious speech, because it has
the capacity to motivate large-scale attitudes, raises important questions as to
the manner by which national and global identities are formed. As ‘religion’
becomes an integral aspect of defining international oppositions and threats
to national security, how states think about the propagation of messages by
religious groups changes greatly.
Thus, there is substantial change in the perceived public importance of
religion and the exercises of communication that relate to it. But modes
of thinking about religion and speech, religion and the state, and religion
and great publics have not sufficiently taken into consideration the new
realities. The consequence is puzzlement about how to deal with the national
and geopolitical aspects of religious ideas. In the last decade, especially,
the privileging, banning, or subsidizing of religious communication has
accelerated, but the question remains whether the paradigms for dealing with
A. SAJÓ (ED.), Censorial Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World,
85-106.
© 2007 ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING. Printed in The Netherlands.
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this subject matter area should be altered. It is impossible to engage in a broad
conceptualization in this paper; my more modest goal is to look at a variety
of contexts where the sponsorship or restriction of religion is encouraged or
restricted by the state and to do so in a comparative way. What I hope to begin
to do in this paper is to map a few new modes of looking at the relationship
between the state and what might be called ‘religious communication’.
The well-known paradigm that serves as the baseline is one in which
‘religious speech’ is a subcategory of a larger, identifiable category called
‘speech’ and one where, under international standards, maximum protection
is to be afforded. The inspiration of this baseline of ‘modernization’ is the
Enlightenment and its ideal of the secular free-thinker able to speak and act
independently of constraint by government. Linked is the idea of government
acting independently of a dominant religion or of religion acting effectively
as if it were government. Equally basic is the principle that a dissenting,
innovative, or competing religion can assert itself without state interference.
The modern project can be seen as honoring societies more plural than
monopolistic, so that power among religions (as well as political parties) is
diffused. Another aspect of the model – reflected in the notion of government
independence – is a sufficient separation so that religions should prosper
without the smothering hand of the state expressed in various establishing
ways (or, in the weaker statement of the model, that such assistance should
be non-discriminatory). A rather new addition to the core is the right of one
person or a set of individuals to seek to convince others to adopt a certain
religion, part of the right of an individual to choose or profess a religion (or
none at all) and the corollary right to resist conversion, including the right to
be sure that unfair power is not used in a proselytizing process.1
All this is within the traditional mode of thinking about these questions.
What is needed is to open or invigorate this discourse through questioning
assumptions that undergird the traditional paradigms. The great global
narratives, said to involve massive battles for ‘hearts and minds’, are being
used to present a geopolitics in which religion is an instrument of power and
sometimes a verbal scabbard, sheathing agendas of politics and force. In the
crunch of these global narratives, not only are there more strongly defined
and aggressive efforts to extend particular religious spheres of influence, but
there are unusually framed struggles between aspects of religion and more
secular forces such as democratization. How these grand narratives play
themselves out must contribute to the redefinition of free speech and religion.
1

We can already begin to see the various complexities, some of which mirror complexities
in other circumstances. For example, problems of comparing free speech for individuals with
free speech for corporate actors find a counterpart here. One kind of analysis may be needed
to protect the free religious speech of individuals against the state or even against the force of
a dominant organized religion. Another kind of analysis may fit where one seeks to establish
the free speech of dissenting or novel religions in a context of monopoly or near-monopoly
religions.
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With the stakes so high, it is hardly surprising that governments increasingly
become involved (no matter what their constitutions say) in addressing the
impact of religious activity. Religion becomes a factor in national security,
both offensively and defensively. This process signifies the reconsideration
of religion as a dominating factor in realpolitik of the unification of state
and religion. And this means rethinking religious communication and its
relationship to the state and the individual in relationship to religion and
speech (including a redefinition in which the individual is subordinated to the
state).

2. Religion and the Market for Loyalties
In an article entitled The Market for Loyalties: The Electronic Media and the
Global Competition for Allegiances,2 I posited a market in which there are a
variety of producers of allegiances (political parties, movements, ideologies,
religions). These producers are competitors and behave in the same way,
sometimes with as much rancor and skill as do advertisers and producers of
loyalties to commercial goods. They combine to limit competition and use
governmental power to sustain their influence and maintain or expand market
share. Cartels of producers of allegiances are abundant. We know too well
circumstances in which the state seeks to enforce a monopoly in the production
of allegiances. Our ideal model of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ assumes ease of
entry and many players existing in a kind of equilibrium of abundance. But
this formula is the exception. Governments, sometimes independent of such
producers or at their behest, intervene to maintain cartels or to force or permit
openings (sometimes small, sometimes radical) to allow new entrants in a
measured way. And at times, events occur or technologies are found that
upend the historic efforts to establish and nourish existing cartels. These
arrangements exist through the actions of individual states or are organized by
regions or aggregated spheres of influence. Strong (or innovative) producers
of allegiances (or state sponsors of such producers) seek to intervene to change
the rules or take other actions to break an existing cartel or existing balance
where they seek to establish a stronger foothold.
Religion has always been a major aspect of markets for loyalties (perhaps
religions were, in some places, the original market players), but how the
strength and influence of religions – as entrants in the competition for loyalties
– comes into national and global debates changes over time, and those changes
worth examining.3 For example, the naming of belief and practice of religion
2
M. Price, The Market for Loyalties: The Electronic Media and the Global Competition for
Allegiances, 104 Yale L. J. 667 (1994).
3
See S. Shapiro, Ministering To the Upwardly Mobile Muslim, New York Times Magazine, 30
April 2006, at 46.
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as a particular right supplies a basis for breaking an existing monopoly or
oligopoly. Examination of how ‘rights’ come to be articulated is one way, but
hardly the only way, to analyze these shifts. Scoring how a state ranks, or how
the international community performs, in terms of recognition of rights does
not capture the changing religio-political map of the world. And when looking
at these markets, another important distinction can be made. One can contrast
competition among religious providers (say, Catholics and Protestants) or
competition between (at least some) religious providers and other producers
of allegiances (e.g., Christian fundamentalists versus those favoring a secular
approach to the world). Analytically, one can examine the market for loyalties
as if it plays itself out solely or primarily within a particular state, with that state
having or purporting to have control (e.g., arguments over church and state in
the US); as compared with a market for loyalties in which the influences are
strong across national boundaries (most evident in areas of intense missionary
activity, as in parts of Africa, or in times of conflict, as with the Balkans).
We are more familiar with markets for loyalties within the boundaries of
a state. One could think of three historic patterns of religion in the singlestate context: a state coupled with a monopoly established religion, a state
constitutionally and in fact dedicated to plural religious practices and a
commitment to separation, and a state that is ruthlessly anti-religious and
that asserts and imposes secularism as a replacement for religion.4 Each of
these paradigms would imply a different view of religious communication.
Taking just one element of regulation, relating to religious broadcasting, the
implications might be as follows. A monopoly state – one with an established
and dominant religion – may either preclude any other religions from the
use of powerful electronic media, or provide the established religion with a
monopoly itself (a variety on this would be a strong and small cartel). Over
time, where a monopoly or established religion is the centerpiece, a slow
atrophying may occur because of the lack of a discipline of competition. The
second model might be thought of as carrying out pluralism in broadcasting
(see the Netherlands example, below). Rules would exist, perhaps even
limiting new entrants, but the notion would be to be inclusive, fair, and
nondiscriminatory, at least as to the historic players. The third model would
seek to maximize secularism by looking at religions as fierce competitors
whose role in the public sphere should be minimized, if not prohibited or
subject to degradation (Turkey and possibly the Soviet Union spring to mind).
There, religious broadcasting would be severely limited if not prohibited.
These are nation-based ways of thinking about the market for loyalties and
the place of religion or religions within them.5 Much of the way we think about
4

This line of thinking grew out of a conversation with Professor Brendan O’Leary, University
of Pennsylvania.
5
See A. Rice, Enemy’s Enemy, Evangelicals v. Muslims in Africa, New Republic, 9 August
2004, at 18.
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regulation and the role of the state has arisen in this nation-based construct.
Of course, the place of religion in the building of allegiances has always had
transnational aspects. But today, obvious by these extensions and modes
of altering allegiances have become increasingly intense and transnational.
Christian proselytizing is measured through continents and regions. The move
toward an Islamist Restoration has global implications. States certainly seek
to maintain the patterns of control that have long existed, indeed maintain the
monopoly or oligopoly that characterized the past and could be construed as a
significant part of national identity. In terms of the models described above, the
state-legitimated monopoly conferred on a dominant religion may be harder to
sustain (though that is far from always the outcome), and a carefully planned
and balanced pluralism is equally at risk. Maintaining strict secularism where
religions can so easily gain entrance also appears problematic.
There is a small literature that conceptualizes religious competition in
market terms and, at times, suggests the regulatory implications. Rodney
Smith writes that,
especially where they are in a majority, nonproselyting religions often seek to
use broadcasting regulation to limit the capacity of minority religions to gain
converts from among adherents of the majority religion. Majority religions do
so by regulating broadcasting in a manner that limits the access of minority
religions to the media or by increasing their own share of time on the media.6

Finke and Iannaccone use a supply-side approach as part of an economic
analysis of the growth of religious organizations. They generally deny that the
growth of various new faiths (they focus on historical religions in the United
States) ought to be attributed to “altered desires, perceptions, or circumstances,”
namely, changes in demand.7 Their approach deprecates the idea that shifts in
large scale adhesions are due to changed concepts of the world or altered
notions of self and society. Their goal is to challenge the traditional assumption
that trends in religious practice come from altered circumstances, increased
poverty, or other changes in outlook. Largely focusing on the US experience,
they assert that “the most significant changes in American religion derive from
shifting supply, not shifting demand. Colonial revivalists, Asian cult leaders
and contemporary televangelists all prospered when regulatory changes gave
them freer access to America’s religious marketplace.”8 For them, it is changes
in the incentives and opportunities facing religious producers that account for
expansion or contraction among faiths, not “some sudden shift in the material
or psychological state of the populace.”9
6

R. Smith, Regulating Religious Broadcasting: Some Comparative Reflections, 1996 BYU L.
Rev. 905.
7
R. Finke & L. R. Iannaccone, Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change, 527 Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (AAAPSS) 27-39 (1993).
8
Id., at 27.
9
Id., at 28.
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They would, if pressed, generalize this assumption into the global context.
If Fink and Iannaccone are correct, and their analysis can be scaled up,
then global changes in the hold of belief systems are a function of shifts in
technology and regulatory patterns: in supply and access rather than in appeal
or content. Perhaps this changes at a given moment: there is a tipping point in
acceptance or decline that supersedes these more technical explanations. And,
perhaps, there are exceptional moments, tulipmanias, where a religion (or an
ideology) achieves a sharp upswing in its place in the market for loyalties.
Finke and Iannaccone attribute significance to the governmental role:
The market model views churches and their clergy as religious producers
who choose the characteristics of their product and the means of marketing
it. Consumers in turn choose what religion, if any, they will accept and
how extensively they will participate in it. As in other markets, government
regulation can profoundly affect the producers’ incentives, the consumers’
options and the aggregate equilibrium.10

In a stroll through US religious history, they claim, among other things, that
“the so-called Great Awakenings” of the period from 1730-1760 and 18001830 succeeded because of religious campaigns that arose “when restrictions
on new sects and itinerant preaching diminished. Early American religion
flourished in response to religious deregulation.”11 They speak about the
Grand Itinerant, George Whitefield, whose efforts to spread his message was
resisted by more established preachers. One group of Congregational ministers
complained that “for a Minister to invade another’s Province and preach in his
Charge without his leave, is disorderly and tends to Confusion, and hurteth
the Work of God.”12 The natural response, in these circumstances, is to seek
to restrict entry through regulation. Finke and Iannaccone call the itinerant
preachers “unregulated competitors in the religious marketplace, foreign
competition that threatened the privileges and profits of a domestic cartel.” In
that early time, the Connecticut legislature prohibited unlicensed propagators
from “preaching in any parish without the approval of the minister of that
parish.”13
A more recent and modest example within the US reflects the process of
cartelization and its casual enforcement. In a 1935 article, Radio and Religion,
Spencer Miller recounted the way the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)
(and others) dealt with the public interest obligations and opportunities
established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with respect
to religion.14 Soon after the NBC was created in 1927 (and in anticipation
of government concern), it formed an Advisory Committee to guide in the
10
11
12
13
14

Id., at 28.
Id., at 29.
Id., at 31.
Id., at 32.
S. Miller, Jr., Radio and Religion, 177 AAAPSS 135-140 (January 1935).
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development of programs in various fields including religious broadcasting.
A standing committee was formed to provide time or opportunities, and they
did so for the benefit of the ‘three great religious communions’ and no more.
Among the principles adopted were the following:
The national broadcasting company will serve only the central or national
agencies of great religious faiths, as for example, the Roman Catholics, the
Protestants, and the Jews, as distinguished from individual churches or small
group movements where the national membership is comparatively small.
The religious message broadcast should be nonsectarian and
nondenominational in appeal.
The religious message broadcast should be of the widest appeal; presenting
the broad claims of religion, which not only aid in building up the personal
and social life of the individual but also aid in popularizing religion and the
church.15

This approach, ‘establishment’-oriented and exclusive, extended to all the
networks and, with tacit governmental approval, remained the dominant
approach for decades. An oft-told story about how televangelism came to
be such a strong force today is the reaction of non-establishment religious
movements to this audio-visual cartel and the campaign to change the rules.
The dominant religions – working with the established networks – sought to
maintain their cartel. In defiance, and with populist pressure on Congress,
the excluded groups created a competing lobbying organization and mastered
the licensing opportunities provided by the Federal Communications Act.16
Of course, it is only against the political structure in the US and the relative
transparency of decision-making that this story can be told in so full a
fashion.
The conscious role that the FCC plays in the problem of market entry –
and the switch in the ideology of approach – is exemplified by a much more
recent example of regulation. What gave birth to the issue was the application
for a transfer of license from a traditional public service broadcaster, WQED
Pittsburgh, to an entity, Cornerstone TeleVision, Inc., that was known for
its religious use of frequencies. On 29 December 1999, the FCC released a
‘additional guidance’ in the face of concerns that the station would be largely
‘religious’ in the face of an historic reservation of noncommercial channels
15

Id.
The story is told in various places: J. K. Hadden, Regulating Religious Broadcasting:
Some Old Patterns and New Trends, in J. E. Wood, Jr. & D. Davis (Eds.), The Role of
Government in Monitoring and Regulating Religion in Public Life (1992); J. K. Hadden &
A. Shupe, Televangelism: Power and Politics on God’s Frontier (1988). As to whether there
was a deliberate effort by mainstream religious organizations to keep evangelical programs off
the primary airwaves, Hoover demurs. He argues that the evangelicals insisted on preaching
doctrine, while the mainstream groups went along with an FCC and network preference for
‘broad truths.’ S. Hoover & D. K. Wagner, History and Policy in American Broadcast Treatment
of Religion, 19 Media, Culture and Society 7-27 (1997).
16
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for general educational purposes.17 To put it in ‘market for loyalties’ terms
(or even Finke and Iannaccone terms), one might say that greater access for
religious producers of allegiances was being made available through the
potential opening up of these noncommercial or public service channels. At
any rate, addressing concerns about shifting the balance (here between the
religious and the secular), the majority of the FCC added these words to the
grant of permission:
[…] not all programming, including programming about religious matters,
qualifies as “general educational” programming. For example, programming
primarily devoted to religious exhortation, proselytizing, or statements of
personally-held religious views and beliefs generally would not qualify as
“general educational” programming. […] The reserved television channels are
intended “to serve the educational and cultural broadcast needs of the entire
community to which they are assigned,” and to be responsive to the overall
public as opposed to the sway of particular political, economic, social or
religious interests.18

The fashioning of this content-related rule gave rise to a great outcry and
pressure. In contrast to the 1930s and 1940s, the balance of political force and
power to mobilize had shifted, with greater strength among those who sought
more openness to religious producers. So great was the heat on the FCC
that a month later, the ‘additional guidance’ was dropped and the previous
decision amended. Harold Furchgott-Roth, reflecting on the change before a
Congressional hearing said:
[…] the Commission’s “additional guidance” raised the specter of discrimination
against certain broadcasters on the basis of their religious message. No other
noncommercial, educational broadcasters, of course, were subject to the “no
exhortation” or “no statement of personally-held views” standard announced in
the Order. In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, the Supreme Court made
clear that once government opens up an avenue for expression, it may not deny
access to those with religious editorial viewpoints simply because of those
viewpoints. Conversely – and contrary to the assertion of some in the WQED
majority – the Court also made clear that allowing such groups to speak on the
same basis as others in order to avoid a violation of the Free Speech Clause
does not, in turn, violate the Establishment Clause. 19

Gloria Tristani, one of the Commissioners who had voted for the guidance,
had a different perception of what had occurred:

17

WQED Pittsburgh v. Cornerstone Television, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order of the
FCC of 15 December 1999, FCC 99-393, at 43.
18
Id., at 44.
19
Testimony of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunication, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Hearing on H.R. 3525, the Religious
Broadcasting Freedom Act and H.R. 4201, the Noncommercial Broadcasting Freedom of
Expression Act of 2000, 13 April 2000.
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Then the pressure campaign began. It was alleged that the Commission was
barring certain religious programming from the reserved channels. Not true
– the Commission simply held that not all religious programming would count
toward the “primarily educational” requirement. Then it was alleged that the
Commission was somehow restricting religious speech, or engaging in a prior
restraint. Again, not true – the decision only dealt with the small number of
television channels set aside for noncommercial educational use. Religious
broadcasters are free to broadcast whatever they wish on commercial channels.
Indeed, Cornerstone has been broadcasting unimpeded on a commercial
television channel in Pittsburgh since 1978. In this case, Cornerstone was
seeking a special privilege from the government – the right to broadcast on
a channel reserved primarily for public education. The government may
selectively promote certain speech (e.g., public educational speech) without
thereby abridging other types of speech (e.g., religious speech). Perhaps the
most disturbing charge leveled against the Commission is that its decision
reflects an “anti-religion bias” at the agency. I reject and resent this type of
attack, reminiscent of a witch-hunt.20

Religious broadcasters, the first majority was implying, have the use
of commercial channels. There was no desire to say, explicitly, that the
noncommercial reservations were for secular purposes (and in a deep
constitutional, though not a pragmatic, sense that would be an error). The
Cornerstone decision played with allocation of tools of persuasion in the
market for loyalties.
Too much of the literature on what might be called religious communication
focuses on the history of religious broadcasting in the United States. This has
been supplemented with histories of televangelism. There is even the sense of
television itself as a religious experience. But there is something wanting about
these analyses. They tend to look at religious broadcasting as a segmented,
separated phenomenon, as an outlier in the history of broadcasting, without
looking at it as an important component of history itself. Religious broadcasting
is an oddity, a place of fraud and deceit, a place not mediated by the broadcast
executive class, and not part of the standard story of broadcasting, networks,
entertainment, and mainstream news. Increasingly, in the twenty-first century,
religious communication is at the center of global concerns.
To turn outside the United States, an intriguing and complex example of
government-enforced cartelization of religious communication involves the
Netherlands. There the mode for achieving it was pillarization, the way the
Dutch (and also the Belgians) have dealt with a specific multicultural society.
Various aspects of life: churches, political parties, trade unions, hospitals,
scouting organizations, broadcasters, and newspapers were divided into pillars.
In the Netherlands, there were originally three pillars (Catholic, Protestant, and
Socialist), but over time, particularly in the broadcasting arena, there was a
fragmentation and a variety of entities, including atheists, gained pillar status.
20

WQED Pittsburgh v. Cornerstone Television, Inc., Order on Reconsideration of 28 January
2000, FCC 00-25.
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The associations fought entry by entities that would strenuously compete with
them (usually, with respect to broadcasting, secular and commercial outsiders
– or pirates). Ultimately, technology (and changes in European Union law
commanding access) spelled the decline of the cartel and the ready entry of
competitors into the previously tight market for allegiances.
Another significant example of cartelization occurred in Lebanon after its
civil war of the 1970s. During the conflict and in the absence of state power, a
large number of radio and television stations were created in what amounted
to a proliferated open market. As part of the pacted settlement, the number
of television stations was dramatically reduced, and access to audiences was
restricted to each of the four major militia and religious participants, including
Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites. Many stations there, including Hezbollah’s
al-Manar, owe their existence to this settlement. These were agreements of
exclusion as well as inclusion. This cartel was affected by the rise of satellite
broadcasting in the Middle East and by international efforts to affect the
internal market, especially the broadcasting of al-Manar.21
Just as important as these national efforts to establish and enforce market
shares among religious producers of allegiances are efforts that cross borders.
These require more scholarly attention. Examples of such transnational
interventions are abundant. One could look at this issue in terms of the impact
of satellite on the ability of fundamentalist imams (exiled to Germany) to
reach audiences in Turkey and alter or intensify the profile of religious practice
there. In Turkey, regulation was attempted (bans on satellite dishes), but it was
insufficiently coercive. Another well-known example is the adaptation of the
audiocassette as a mode of spreading intensity of allegiance to fundamental
ayatollahs in the Shah’s Iran. These are similar to examples of technology
performing the role of deregulation – as ways of increasing the effectiveness
of supply, where changes in technologies serve as powerful deregulating
agents. Turning again to Finke and Iannaccone, and applying their analysis to
large scale refiguring of religious markets, several issues could be identified:
What relationship is there between new communication technologies
and changes in the religious landscape? What effect has deregulation of
restrictions on missionaries had on the rate of conversion? To what extent
have restrictions on proselytizing maintained market share in Russia for the
Orthodox Church? What has been the overall impact of the growth of Middle
East satellite services in terms of regional allegiances? Who controls access to
the satellite transponders that serve the region, and how has that gate-keeping
function been exercised? To what extent are some of the entrants (al Arabiya,
21

Al-Manar was created by Hezbollah in 1991, with financial support from Iran. In 1997, the
Lebanon government granted it one of only five broadcasting licenses, under pressure from
Syria. The US, France, and Spain have all banned its broadcasts; in 2004, the US placed alManar on the Terrorist Exclusion List, blocking its broadcasts to North America. See A. Jorisch,
Hizbullah TV, 24/7, 11 Middle East Quarterly 20 (2004), http://www.meforum.org/article/583.
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for example) meant to be secularized balancing forces? Changes cannot be
attributed to technological and regulatory change alone. An implication of the
Fink and Iannaccone analysis would be to consider which producer is most
adept at using the new technologies, i.e., of expanding supply to nourish the
ideological product.
To suggest the geopolitics of these cross-boundary efforts, it is useful to
quote the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. He was hinting
at this new reality in a 2006 talk to the Council on Foreign Relations. He said
the following:
Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but
for the most part we – our country – our government, has not adapted. Consider
that the violent extremists have established “media relations committees” –
these are terrorists and they have media relations committees that meet and talk
about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They’ve proven to be highly
successful at manipulating the opinion elites of the world. […] They know
that communications transcend borders – and that a single news story, handled
skillfully, can be as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs, as any other
method of military attack. […] Our federal government is really only beginning
to adapt our operations to the 21st century.22

Secretary Rumsfeld was not discussing religious groups, per se, nor was he
discussing systematic modes of affecting the market for loyalties through
technology and law. This was more of a burst of reaction to altered realities,
to the recognition that the market had significantly changed and it was not
clear to those in the status quo ante how to react to those changes. He was
discussing skill in designing the message, not skill in dealing with an altered
technological environment. He was not discussing regulatory impositions to
restrict or favor entry of a particular religious group. What was critical was
comparative expertise in exploiting changed circumstances. And these changed
circumstances had important consequences in the market for loyalties.23 In
short, inappropriate or differential adaptation to the technologies leads to
differential consequences in the market for allegiances.

3. State Regulation and Proselytism
There are many ways of describing state intervention in the religiouscommunication market for loyalties. In this section, I will focus on an area
of discourse that has historically had transnational dimensions: control of
campaigns for conversion (from barbarian to Christian, from one religion to
another, from sects or divisions within a religion to alternatives). These are
22

Speech by US Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Council on Foreign Relations, 17
February 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060217-12574.html.
23
See further the Report of the US Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic
Communication. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.
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often seen through the prism of proselytizing and its regulation. Proselytizing
is a useful technique to study. It has two faces. On the one hand, it is speech
at its most central, the articulation of ideas most important to the speaker
and possibly of redemptive significance to the receiver. On the other hand,
proselytizing can be perceived as disruptive or subversive of existing
arrangements among providers of allegiances. We can look at practices
concerning proselytization as an example of state and non-state behavior in
the market for loyalties.
There are states that regulate conversion practices formally or informally
to maintain existing shares, including near monopoly status, in the religious
cartel. Informal agreements exist between or among religious entities that
tolerate some degree of conversion advocacy but also suggest limits on the
practice. Greece, Russia, and the states of Central Asia all provide case studies
of regulation of efforts to convert. There are examples of one state trying to
influence conversion regulation in another state. The regulation of proselytizing
practices can be studied by looking at particular religious contexts. Focusing on
evangelical Christian churches or church-agents generally, different contexts
yield varying regulatory environments: China, with its current emphasis on
secularism; Russia, with its Orthodox tradition;24 and the Middle East, where
there are efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity.25 Or one can look across
national boundaries at specific technologies of conversion. Broadcasting
provides a specific instance (not necessarily the most effective). We can think
of regulation of religious broadcasting as turning, in large part, on how the
regulator sees the channel, i.e., as undergirding or reaffirming religious faith
among those who hold it, or, rather, as a more aggressive agent of change,
designed primarily to encourage change or conversion.
Here, as elsewhere in the regulation of religious communication,
international norms become a factor in setting limits (effective or not) on
state action. And just for that reason, the way in which the international
norms are constructed becomes itself an element in shaping the market for
loyalties. An overriding and effective norm that privileges the right to convert
can be a victory for the freedom to speak and believe, but it also can favor
certain religions over others and the process of change over a commitment to
24

In Russia, there are mutual arrangements between religious entities (or attempts for
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stable power arrangements. In this way, defending or qualifying the right to
proselytize (or the right to be converted or to hear arguments for change) alters
the power of states to maintain a given cartel in the market for loyalties. By
guaranteeing rights to receive and impart information, a norm is established,
quite obviously, that encourages greater competition and somewhat favors
religions that are committed to active conversion. In examining human
rights, one needs to understand the various perspectives. Is there, under the
human rights regimes, a clear individual right to choose whatever religion
one wants (a right to commit apostasy, for example)? Is there a right to be
free from (coercive or manipulative) efforts to proselytize, and under what
circumstances can the state limit that right?26
The language of the human rights documents is deceptively simple. Article
18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Section 2 seems to limit the right of proselytizers to use “coercion” as a means
of inducing conversion or exercise of “choice.” This has led to a discourse,
including in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, of what
should be considered coercion. The ICCPR had been amended on this issue
differentiating it from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
“religious freedom” in the 1948 version explicitly included the freedom to
“change” one’s religion, and in the later version (above) the word “change”
disappeared. Freedom became the “freedom to have or to adopt” a religion
or belief. Perhaps this was a subtle effort – under pressure from newly
decolonized states to make it clear that maintaining religious beliefs was a
value equivalent to altering them.
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

26

For one approach to these questions, see Stahnke, id., at 251.
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Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Note that Article 9 has the “freedom to change” language that was altered in the
ICCPR. Note also that both the ICCPR and the European Convention provide
(in the usual form) for limitations on the means of “manifesting” one’s religion
and, likely, activities related to proselytizing are such a manifestation, often
a central one. The issue then would be under what circumstances, when all
other requirements are met (prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic
society), limits on this kind of activity might be justified. Specific attitudes
toward conversion appear in Arab states. Article 10 of the Cairo Declaration
on Human Rights in Islam of 1990 states that “It is prohibited to exercise any
form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to
convert him to another religion or to atheism.” 27
An example of this problem is a series of cases from Greece (where
proselytizing of certain kinds is banned). In the case of Larissis,28 officers
in the airforce argued that their prosecution, conviction, and punishment
for proselytism violated Article 9 of the European Convention. The Court
acknowledged that the government had interfered with the officers’ rights
to “freedom […] to manifest [their] religion or belief.”29 Looking at the
conditions in which such interference was authorized, the Court held that it
had been “prescribed by law” and, more interestingly, had a “legitimate aim,”
namely, protecting the rights and freedoms of others. The Court also found
that as far as the measures taken following the proselytizing of airmen under
their command was concerned, the aim was of preventing disorder in the
armed forces and thus protecting public safety and order.30
Was the Greek prosecution “necessary in a democratic society?” Here
the decision spoke, though obliquely, to the interest of the state in refereeing
in techniques designed to shift loyalties. First, “while religious freedom is
primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom
to ‘manifest [one’s] religion,’ including the right to try to convince one’s
neighbour, for example through ‘teaching.’”31 Still, Article 9 does not “protect
27
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990, reprinted in I. Brownlie &
G. S. Goodwin-Gill (Eds.), Basic Documents on Human Rights 764-769 (2002). See also
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improper proselytism, such as the offering of material or social advantage or
the application of improper pressure with a view to gaining new members
for a Church.”32 In the case of proselytizing airmen, the Greek government
contended that the applicants had abused the influence they enjoyed as air
force officers and had “committed the acts in question in a systematic and
repetitive manner. The measures taken against them were justified by the
need to protect the prestige and effective operation of the armed forces and to
protect individual soldiers from ideological coercion.”33
The Court concluded:
[…] the hierarchical structures which are a feature of life in the armed forces
may colour every aspect of the relations between military personnel, making it
difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the approaches of an individual of superior
rank or to withdraw from a conversation initiated by him. Thus, what would
in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous exchange of ideas which the
recipient is free to accept or reject, may, within the confines of military life, be
viewed as a form of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse
of power. It must be emphasised that not every discussion about religion or
other sensitive matters between individuals of unequal rank will fall within
this category. Nonetheless, where the circumstances so require, States may
be justified in taking special measures to protect the rights and freedoms of
subordinate members of the armed forces.34

Larissis demonstrates the potential for international norms to act as a brake on
the power of states to regulate the market for loyalties (though it also shows
the complexity of defining and applying the human rights norms concerning
religion and proselytizing). It indicates that there are issues of speech and
privilege for the proselytizer and, as well, for the object of the proselytizing.
It suggests the idea of inducement and of context.
The issue of regulating conversion practices was and remains an important
one in Russia and Ukraine and other post-Soviet societies. In 1997, by an
overwhelming vote, the Russian Parliament passed a bill establishing two
categories of religious institutions: ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional.’Traditional
religious communities, legally referred to as ‘religious organizations,’ were
defined as those with an established presence in Russia of fifteen or more
years. They included Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. Under
the statute these entities have – though there is some debate about this – a
privileged status that allows them, among other things, to run radio and
television stations. Roman Catholic, Baptist, and breakaway or dissident
Russian Orthodox denominations, even those that have been in Russia longer
than fifteen years, were classified as religious ‘groups,’ and did not have
the same bundle of rights, including the right to run broadcasting outlets as
32
33
34
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religious ‘organizations.’35 Though “[…] the stated aim of the law was to
restrict ‘totalitarian sects’ and ‘dangerous religious cults,’” the law in fact can
be said to discriminate against less-established religious groups, especially
Protestant and para-Christian denominations, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and
Mormons, by making it difficult for them to establish institutional bases.36
Catherine Wanner, who has written about comparative Russian and Ukrainian
post-Soviet approaches to this question, places the statute in a national identity
context:
Ukrainian government and cultural leaders remain obsessed by the growth of
nontraditional religious groups, meaning neither Orthodox nor Greek-Catholic.
The growing presence of foreign missionaries in Ukraine buttressing these new
religious institutions strains the ideal of Ukrainians as a unified ethno-religious
people and complicates the process of nation building.37

The desire to rein in proselytism, especially by foreigners and by foreignimported nontraditional religious groups, was “palpable” among government
leaders and even among the population at large.38
These approaches can be seen not only as a competition among religious
entities, but within a larger environment of competition for allegiances. At
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Protestant fundamentalist denominations
were perceived as aggressively anti-communist and that gave the movement
a special immediate appeal. The ideological vacuum left by the collapse of
communism as a viable worldview and a source of individual and collective
meaning was replaced, according to Wanner, by a “religious-based orientation
to self and society.”39 Indeed, Wanner claims, “the disorientation prompted by
sweeping social change as the Soviet system began to fall apart caused some
to embrace religion as an anti-Soviet alternative, as a new moral compass
to guide their ideas and behavior amidst social confusion and economic
collapse.”40 Perhaps one could call this a non-Finke and Iannaccone approach
to understanding altered market shares for competing religious entities.
Many religious groups engage in self-regulation in terms of what are
considered appropriate in efforts to reach out and expand. Self-regulation (by
the group or by the cartel) limits the mode of expansion. Religious entities that
consider proselytizing prohibited, or impose strong ethical limits on activities
(perhaps more restrictive than would be imposed by the European Court of
Human Rights), can be compared with those that have a more aggressive
35
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set of standards. Furthermore, host states have different interpretations of
what constitutes ‘coercion’ in proselytizing activities. Mark Elliott’s essay
offers a useful insight into the complex legal and ethical questions relating to
national regulation and self-regulation of proselytizing. Sensitive to national
regulation that minimizes or eliminates inducements that are inconsistent with
ethical religious practice, Elliott reaffirms that [p]roselytism is fine if there is
no “coercion, material inducement, violation of privacy, and preachments to
captive audiences.” 41 Commenting on post-Soviet Russia, he contends:
Increasingly the xenophobic Russian Orthodox Church sees not only such
manipulative charity but all Western Protestant compassionate ministries and
communications as illegitimate material inducements. […] throughout the
1990s Patriarch Alexis II decried the “massive influx” of “well-organized and
well-financed” missions of “foreign proselytizing faiths,” “zealots” in search of
“new markets.”42

I have only touched the surface of the debate over active efforts to convert,
state regulation of them, and the application of international norms to temper
such state rules. Regulation of proselytizing is a case study in the structuring
of cartels. It is an example of the complexity of relying on ‘rights’-related
jurisprudence alone. And an examination of proselytizing opens up what
might be meant by a broader concept, namely regulation or control of
religious communication. And it brings us back to the issue of trans-border
religious broadcasting. How does one map attitudes toward proselytizing onto
the practices of religious broadcasters? It would be wrong to contend that
broadcasting is intrinsically manipulative, but some practices of persuasion
by radio or television – those that promise cures, perhaps those that defraud
or even exaggerate, may be inconsistent with ethical and legal standards and
could, possibly, be subject to state regulation as coercive under international
standards.43

41
M. Elliott, Evangelism and Proselytism in Russia: Synonyms or Antonyms?, 25 International
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42
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4. International Considerations
One of the interesting aspects of contemporary markets for loyalties – as I
have mentioned above – is the activity of one state intervening in the market
of another state. One could ask, for example, whether the United States has a
stake in the working of the market for religious loyalties in Egypt, Syria, Mali,
or Indonesia. Partly, this stake is tied to the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’.
The US, as well as other states, claims to have a strong interest in strengthening
what is called moderate Islam and diminishing the power of certain strains of
fundamentalism (certainly what has been called Islamo-fascism by President
Bush). This is true not only domestically, but globally. The US government
may seek to modulate Islam and forms of Islamic education in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Partly, reflecting domestic political interests, the US may have a
stake in protecting Christian groups abroad (in Nigeria, China, and elsewhere)
and protecting the right of Christian missionaries to practice their activities.
A curious note to all of this is the American statute: the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), the vehicle by which the US reflects
a belief in certain universal or human rights principles regarding freedom of
religion.44 This legislation is relevant because it commits the US government
(and its State Department and other missions abroad) to further religious
freedom, as (more or less) defined in international documents, with a gloss of
US interpretation.45 IRFA compels the Executive Branch to document and take
certain actions where religious freedom is denied in foreign states. The US
perception of religion in society relies on ‘change of religion’ as a necessary
right.46
The International Religious Freedom Act is interesting for other reasons.
IRFA can be seen, quite simply, as the projection of standards internationally
that permit new entrants to arise in foreign markets of loyalties. The Act
also implies bringing US economic and other power to bear to compel such
markets to open. Among its mandates are that the Department of State prepare
national reports that survey how states permit or violate religious freedom
as it is defined or approximated by the law. In these reports, there are a
variety of related interventions in Islamic states. These include prohibitions
on proselytizing by non-Muslim religions, prohibitions on having and
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distributing certain tracts or religious material, prohibitions on the entry of
foreign clergy, and prohibitions on any private use of broadcast frequencies,
much less religious ones.
This prompts a return to the earlier question of the stake one nation has in
the religious market for loyalties elsewhere. The September 2004 Report of
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication suggests
some of the motivations for US actions: “Islam’s internal and external struggle
over values, identity, and change is the dominant political arena in which
strategic communication takes place […] Islam’s crisis must be understood
as a contest of ideas and engaged accordingly.”47 The Report notes, among
other things, “the hostile atmosphere in which terrorists act is reinforced
by religious messages […]; the contest of ideas is taking place not just in
Arab and other Islamic countries but in the cities and villages of Europe,
Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere.”48 The Science Board sets forth a
context (one that is subject to active debate with important consequences): the
large narrative, it claims, is not about terrorism, but debate over an Islamic
Restoration, the removal of antiquated, dictatorial governments that stand
in the way of a unified whole because they are keeping hold of dictatorial
power. Thinking about religion and communication in this ambitious story is
different from thinking about proselytizing Christians (who may have their
attention on the next world somewhat more than radically reorganizing the
political structure of the present one). In this respect, one can ask: What is
the communications system of the Umma? In a non-secularized environment
like the Arab Middle East, how does one distinguish between ‘religious
stations’ and secular counterparts? How are publics being mobilized? What is
the mode of intervention by those interested in changing them? What exactly
does freedom of religious communication mean where there is so decisive
and comprehensive a goal?

5. Regulation of Religious Communication
Let us take a few other areas affecting religious communication, and try
to link them to the market for loyalties model. In the United States, one
current phenomenon is new and more extensive enforcement of ‘indecency
standards’ by the FCC on radio and television broadcasters, with large fines
and indisputable chilling effects. There are several explanations for this
increased zest for enforcement. One is that those who are engaged (on the
Commission and the Congress) actually believe in the standards they are
47
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enforcing or in their duty to enforce them. A second, often articulated, view
is that it is part of a different (not essentially religious) market, namely the
market for votes. But a third explanation is that this is a process of what might
be called ‘sacralizing’ the commercial broadcasters so as to make them less
effective competitors, less capable of advancing a particular and captivating
view of the secular. While commercial broadcasters complain that restricting
them while allowing cable channels to operate free of indecency standards
hampers their competitive posture, churches or advocates of a more guarded
lifestyle can claim to be less endangered.
Another interesting example involves new British laws seeking to reduce
the maligning of religious groups. These laws, especially the Racial and
Religious Hatred Act of 2006, are provisions criminalizing incitement of
religious hatred and are designed to protect less dominant religions. How
does this fit within the market for loyalties paradigm? This is not the usual
case where the anti-blasphemy law appears to exist to protect the dominant
religion. It is rather an instance where there is interest in maintaining a version
of the status quo of plurality, of giving a sense to an embattled group that their
market share is not being endangered, preserving stability rather than having
an environment in which competition is brutal. It is a method of seeking to
include and protect ‘moderate Islam’ within the cartel, while criminalizing or
marginalizing more fundamental elements.
I have been interested in the regulation of sermons and other religious
communication as an example of cartelization and the market for loyalties.
In the post-September 11 world, for example, increased attention is being
paid internationally to what is taught in madrasas not only in Pakistan, but in
London and Amsterdam. All of a sudden, states that have benignly neglected
supervision see themselves as having a positive stake in whether the Islamist
teaching is ‘moderate’ or extremist. As to sermons, the arrest and deportation
of the fierce British imam, Abu Hamza is an example. As one of the British
papers put it:
[…] the role of the 47-year-old Egyptian-born cleric in radicalising the men
responsible for Britain’s worst mainland terror atrocity, the London suicide
bombings, can be revealed. So, too, can the extraordinary influence Hamza
and the Finsbury Park mosque had over some of the world’s most notorious
terrorists. For in the six years the hook-handed former mujahidin fighter was
preaching his anti-Western sermons in North London, it became a breeding
ground for terrorism under his controlling power.49

A favorite example of mine, however, involves the discovery of efforts by
the Wahhabi sect to obtain a monopoly position among chaplains in prisons,
and then the effort by the relevant governments to break the monopoly and
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virtually ban the sect from participating in that particular market for loyalties.
Here is an excerpt from US Senator Charles Schumer explaining the context
during Congressional hearings:
Let me give you an example of how Wahhabism has wreaked some degree
of havoc in my own backyard in New York State. For 20 years the New York
State Department of Corrections employed Warith Deen Umar as one of its
chaplains, eventually appointing him administrative chaplain of the New York
Department of Correctional Services. A strict believer in Wahhabi Islam, Umar
was responsible for the hiring and firing of all chaplains in the New York State
prison system, exercising complete control over personnel matters. But last
year Mr. Umar was banned from ever again entering a New York State prison
after he incited prisoners against America, specifically preaching to inmates
that the 9/11 hijackers should be remembered as martyrs.
[…] militant Wahhabism is the only form of Islam that is preached to the
12,000 Muslims in federal prisons. That is against the American view of
pluralism.50

6. Conclusion
The purpose of this essay has been to sketch some elements of a still woefully
incomplete theory of regulation of religious communications. But it has also
been to suggest limitations and deficiencies in approaches that look solely to
human rights norms and to rights of speech and belief as ways of thinking about
religion, media, and society. The argument from the perspective of a market
for loyalties analysis is more descriptive than normative. It is descriptive
because it suggests how states engage in shaping and regulating competition
among religious groups. It approaches the normative as it implies that one
state’s religious formation, religious education, and religious tendencies have
a global environment – a serious impact on the political and security structure
in another state. Because of such externalities, there is a justified interest in
the international community (and in various affected states) in such national
formations. These can be articulated in international norms and in unilateral
actions.
There are periods of stability and periods of extensive change in particular
markets for loyalties. Three things now characterize the role of religion in the
market: there are large scale disturbances undermining stability in significant
markets (or perhaps just as important, there are changes in perceptions of how
the market is functioning). Market players are moving from persuasion to the
use of force. There is the re-association, or stronger association, of religion
with the political. And finally, there is the move from the domestic to the
transnational.
50
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Religions compete with each other to gain adherents. They compete with
other forces (secularism, consumerism, etc.) as well. And, granted that they
act like competitors in other markets and seek advantages, some competition
is fair and some is unfair. Communications are central to their enterprise.
Personal, organizational, and mass communication are the mainstays of this
competition. These efforts can take the form of mass-producing copies of the
Bible in the vernacular, or competition can take the form of tens of thousands
of missionaries in Africa and Latin America. It can take the form of religious
broadcasting stations reaching across national boundaries. Competitors have
some common stake (under certain circumstances) in the establishment of
rules that will allow each of them to function. At least they feel so if there is
a danger that they will not be dominant. Most competitors like stability and
often seek rules that preserve their market shares (even if those market shares
are far from equal). Apocalyptic or messianic religions may feel that their time
of dominance will certainly come and that actions to accelerate that day are
more than justifiable. Competitors have a common interest in excluding new
entrants (this is a corollary of the rule of maintaining market share). These
factors lead to certain rules in the business world and probably do in religion
as well. Competitors, and Christian groups in particular, seek the patronage of
powerful governments to protect them and assure their capacity to function
throughout the world.
And, of course, the making of rules is not up to the competitors alone.
Consumers, citizens, and ‘buyers’ in the market for allegiances have a stake
in rules that govern the behavior of the great producers. Consumers may
have an interest in a set of mechanisms that allows supply to expand, that
permits innovation, and that allows access to new technologies. In the great
understanding of Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty, they have
an interest in Exit, though the reinforcement of Loyalty is sometimes in the
mutual interest of seller and buyer.51
Examining this market and looking at forms that it takes does not abrogate
the need to examine what might be called ‘fundamental rights,’ such as the
right of the individual. It does not foreclose the need to determine which state
interventions are appropriate, but it provides a different context for analysis.
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